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Recent Developments 
Remsburg v. Montgomery: 
A Leader of a Hunting Party Has No Duty to Protect a Victim of an Accident 
Resulting from the Negligence of a Hunting Party Member 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held, in a case 
of first impression, the leader of a 
hunting party has no duty to protect 
a victim of an accident resulting from 
the negligence of a hunting party 
member. Remsburg v. Montgom-
ery, 376 Md. 568, 603, 831 A.2d 
18,38 (2003). The court found no 
special relationship existed creating 
a special duty to protect a victim 
from third-party negligence. Id. at 
599, 831 A.2d at 36. 
On November 28, 1998, 
Charles and Brian Montgomery 
("Montgomerys") hid at the edge of 
their property to hunt deer. Shortly 
thereafter, James Remsburg, Sr.'s 
("James, Sr.") hunting party, which 
included his son James Remsburg, 
Jr. ("James, Jr."), positioned them-
selves near the Montgomerys. As 
the Montgomerys moved to a new 
location, a shotgun slug grazed Brian 
Montgomery's neck and passed 
through Charles Montgomery's right 
shoulder. James, Jr., believing he 
aimed at a deer, shot from a tree 
stand located near the Montgom-
erys' position. 
The Montgomerys filed suit in 
the Circuit Court for Frederick 
County against James, Jr. and 
James, Sr. alleging negligence and 
trespass. James, Sr. filed a Motion 
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for Summary Judgment claiming the 
Montgomerys failed to assert a 
legally cognizable duty on James, Sr. 
to protect them from third-party 
actions. The circuit court granted 
the motions. The Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland vacated the 
decision with respect to the 
negligence claim, holding factual 
disputes existed that could establish 
J ames, Sr. had a duty to protect the 
Montgomerys from James, Jr.'s 
negligent acts. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari. 
The court of appeals began by 
discussing whether an individual 
owed a duty to protect a victim from 
third-party negligent acts. Id. at 
583, 831 A.2d at 27. Generally, 
absent a special duty, there is no 
duty to protect someone from the 
actions of a third party. Id. The 
court identified three ways that 
create a special duty to protect 
another from a negligent third party: 
(1) by statute or rule, (2) by a 
contractual or other private 
relationship, or (3) by virtue of a 
special relationship. Id. at 583-84, 
831 A. 2d at 27. The court briefly 
analyzed the first two methods and 
found they did not apply to the facts 
of this case. Id. at 585, 589-90, 
831 A.2d at 28, 30. 
There is no duty to control a 
third person's conduct unless a 
special relationship exists between 
certain parties. Id. at 583, 831 
A.2d at 27. The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 315 (1965) 
identifies: (1) relationships between 
the actor and third party giving rise 
to a duty to control third-party 
conduct and (2) relationships 
between actor and other giving the 
other a right to protection. Id. at 
590,831 A.2d at 31. 
Addressing the first prong of 
this analysis, the court examined the 
nature ofthe relationship between 
James, Sr. and James, Jr. Id. To 
create a special relationship giving 
rise to a legal duty, the actor must 
have c~ntrol over the third party 
and special knowledge of the risk 
a third party poses to others. Id. 
at 591, 831 A.2d at 3l. Cases in 
which such a relatiqnship existed 
involved such extreme circum-
stances as the negligent release of 
a contagious patient from a hospital 
and the escape of a homicidal 
maniac from a private sanitarium 
due to negligence. Id. at 591, 831 
A.2d at 32. These cases suggest 
the requirement of a custodial 
relationship to establish a duty to 
protect. Id. at 592, 831 A.2d at 
32. The court held James, Sr.'s 
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status as the hunting party's leader 
did not constitute custodial control 
over James, Jr. and did not establish 
that duty. Id. 
Under the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts § 314A (1965), a duty 
to protect may also be established 
by virtue of the relationship between 
James, Sr. and the Montgomerys. 
Id. at 594, 831 A.2d at 32. The 
court previously recognized such a 
relationship existed between an 
innkeeper and his guests and a 
common carrier and its passengers. 
Id. In each case, victims were 
dependant on the actor by virtue of 
their situational relationship. Id., 
831 A.2d at 33. The court 
determined the Montgomerys 
controlled their own land and did not 
depend on anyone for protection. 
Id. The court also noted although 
both parties interacted in the past 
regarding hunting rights, those 
interactions did not create a 
dependent relationship. Id. The 
court concluded the Montgomerys 
did not depend on James, Sr. for 
protection from James, Jr. and no 
special relationship existed. Id. 
In addition to the Restatement, 
a special relationship may also be 
established by "virtue of a party's 
actions." Id. at 595, 831 A.2d at 
33. In determining whether such a 
relationship existed, the court of 
appeals applied the standard 
formulated in Ashburn v. Anne 
Arundel County. Id. at 595, 831 
A.2d at 34 (citing Ashburn, 306 
Md. 617, 510A.2d 1078 (1986)). 
Originally applitd to a police officer, 
the Ashburn test requires an actor 
to affirmatively act "to protect the 
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specific victim ... thereby inducing 
the victim's specific reliance" upon 
the protection. Id. at 596, 831 A.2d 
at 34. The Ashburn test requires 
both affirmative action to protect a 
specific victim and specific reliance 
by the victim on that action. Id. 
James, Sr. 's previous dealings with 
the Montgomerys regarding hunting 
rights did not constitute affirmative 
actions to protect the Mont-
gomerys. Id. at 599, 831 A.2d at 
36. Furthermore, the court con-
cluded the Montgomerys did not 
specifically rely on James, Sr. 's 
actions for protection. Id. The 
court held no special relationship 
existed. Id. at 599, 376 Md. at 599, 
831 A.2d at 36. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland stated it previously 
applied the Ashburn test only to 
matters involving public officials. 
Id. The court acknowledged the 
expansion of the Ashburn test; 
however, special relationships will 
be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis. Id. The Ashburn test must 
focus primarily on a party's conduct 
that may induce reliance by another 
party. Id. 
This case firmly establishes 
application of the Ashburn test to 
private matters and will no doubt 
generate more litigation in the area 
of liability for third-party negli-
gence. Although the applicability of 
the Ashburn test appears clear, the 
court's requirement for a case-by-
case analysis will only serve to 
confuse the question of when a 
special relationship does or does not 
exist. The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland has opened the floodgates 
to third-party actions, which may 
well only be closed by clear, 
restrictive future holdings. 
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